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CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
AND NATURAL LAW
MARK R. MACGUIGAN*

T HERE IS A SENSE in which the question of obedience to law is a problem solely for the natural lawyer. The positivist is concerned by
hypothesis with the validity and legality of law, not with its efficacy or
justice. Validity and legality are purely formal concepts: law is valid,
it is "legal," if it is enacted or adjudicated into being in the proper form.
Efficacy and justice on the other hand, are concerned with the content
of the legal rule: a law is efficacious when it is actually being obeyed
by the people whose conduct it aims to govern, and it is just when it
should be obeyed by them. The natural lawyer is interested in efficacy
and justice as well as in validity and legality, and so it would appear
that only for him is conformity to law a problem qua jurisprudent or
even qua jurist.' For him the ultimate theoretical question in jurisprudence "what is law?" has as a counterpart at the other end of the
scale an ultimate practical question (and one by no means unrelated to
the first theoretical question) "should this particular law be obeyed?"
Yet it would seem that to the more sophisticated positivist today,
fidelity to law has also become a jurisprudential issue. Professor H. L. A.
Hart has recently made the point2 that positivism has a moral as well
as an intellectual contribution to make to jurisprudence: one of the
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The natural lawyer is more interested in justice than in efficacy, but in order to
know whether a law, even a morally good one, can be borne by a particular people
at a particular time, he must also know whether it is or will be efficacious. For
example, moralists appear to be reaching the conclusion that a law forbidding professional boxing would be good, but it is highly doubtful whether it would yet be
supported by popular feeling.

Interest in the efficacy of law is, of course, considered more characteristic of
the sociological jurisprudent than of the natural lawyer. For purposes of this
discussion I have assimilated the sociologist's position to that of the naturalist, as
both, in contrast to the positivist, have justicistic philosophies.

There is a sharp attack on the empty formalism of the strict positivist view
on the ground that it is incompatible with the rule of law in democratic society
in D'Entr~ves, Legalita e Legittimita, Studi in Onore de Emilio Grosa (1960).
2 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
620-21 (1958).
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most beneficial results of keeping the
spheres of law and morals entirely separate is that moral criticism of law is kept
clear, simple, and powerful. Hart presents
his view as a mere restatement of Bentham and Austin, but in truth it is a wholesome innovation within positivism. Whether or not Professor Fuller is being overly
optimistic in believing that Professor Hart's
contribution to jurisprudential dialogue
eliminates once and for all "the pretense
3
of the ethical neutrality of positivism,"
at least it establishes a precedent for the
consideration by positivists too of problems of civil disobedience. Thus recent
events in Birmingham, Alabama, and Cambridge, Maryland, where the minority demonstrated in protest against inadequate
legal guarantees of equality, and in Oxford, Mississippi, and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, where the majority resisted the extension of equality, are common jurisprudential ground for positivist and naturalist alike, though the orientation of the
reflections may well be different. My own
observations will be made within a natural
law framework, but will, I hope, also appear relevant to those in other jurisprudential traditions.
The popular attitude towards civil disobedience is somewhat ambivalent. On
the one hand, popular feeling exalts peace
and order in society almost to the status
of an absolute and views with strong disapproval any form of disobedience to lawful authority. For historical illustrations
of this attitude the events of the last year
or two will serve as well as any. The
violent resistance of the students at the
University of Mississippi to the courtordered admission of a Negro student to
3Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
672 (1958).

their institution was regarded most unsympathetically by the vast majority of
Canadians and Americans. The popular
feeling was accurately expressed by President Kennedy when in his address to the
people of the United States on September
30, 1962, he stated in the following words
the citizen's duty of obedience to the law
of the land: "Americans are free . . . to
disagree with the law-but not to disobey
it."' 4 Similarly in the 1962 Saskatchewan
medicare dispute between the government
and the medical profession many who were
sympathetic to the physicians' viewpoint
nevertheless strongly opposed their withdrawal of services as an attempt to nullify
an enactment of the legislature. This point
of view was expressed by the Toronto
Globe and Mail, when it wrote apropos
of medicare disputes in general, words
which echo President Kennedy's: "Canadians have the right to disagree with a law,
but once a law has been duly passed by
a duly elected government, they do not
have the right to disobey that law."' 5 On
the one hand, then, there is the unequivocal
view that citizens do not have the right to
disobey the law, however unjust they may
consider it.
But this is not the whole story. There is
a long tradition of support in the Western
world for resistance and even revolution
to unjust laws or unjust rulers. For instance, do we not all applaud the very
nearly successful attempt of the German
conspirators to assassinate Adolph Hitler
on July 20, 1944? Moreover, aside from
those few who believe with Rebecca West
that all revolutions are vicious, is there not
now general approbation of the American
Revolution, even among the British? In4New York Times, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 22, col. 6.
Toronto Globe and Mail, Oct. 30, 1962, p. 6,
col. 6.
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deed, there is Biblical support for revolution in the revolts of the Hebrews under
the Maccabees against their foreign oppressors.
Disobedience of civil authority has been
throughout human history both fact and
theory. As fact, disobedience has ranged
from the more to the less violent, according to the nature of the person or law resisted and the temper of the men who
formed the resistance; among the forms
civil disobedience has taken have been
revolution, regicide, "underground" resistance, riots, strikes, picketing, refusal to
obey superior orders, boycotts of commodities, hunger strikes, freedom rides,
marches, sit-ins, protest meetings, and simple non-compliance. As theory, disobedience has been the subject of consideration
by philosophers not so much from the
viewpoint of whether it is legitimate at all,
and if so, when; a few philosophers like
Hobbes have taught that resistance to political authority is unjustifiable in all circumstances, but for the most part philosophers have developed theories of resistance, and have attempted to say when it
is justifiable and when it is not. 6
Neither American, nor Western, nor
world history or political theory will allow
us, then, to interpret in an absolutistic way
President Kennedy's words that a citizen
is free "to disagree with the law-but not
to disobey it." There are too many precedents on the other side for us to be consistent in denying all civil disobedience.
What we might perhaps like to say, I suppose, is that laws which we think are good
ought to be obeyed, and those which we
6Hobbes allows the exercise of the right of
self-defense by an individual against the sovereign, but maintains that no one else may assist

him. HOBBES,
1904).
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think are unjust ought not to be obeyed,
but it requires little sophistication to see
that we cannot devise a neutral rationalization assigning to ourselves such powers of
judgment without at the same time granting them to our fellow citizens, whose
views as to justice and injustice may not
be the same as ours. The white Southerner,
for instance, resists desegregation according to law, not merely because he is firmly
attached to the status quo of white supremacy, but because he honestly believes in
white supremacy on moral grounds, however mistaken they may be objectively. We
must recognize that, in attempting to force
desegregation on the Southern minority,
the American majority is attempting to
substitute its morality for the minority
morality. This is not to say that it should
not be done, but it would be naive to expect to do it without encountering resistance.
In the ancient world the tyrant was a
well-known figure both in fact and in
theory. Though neither Plato nor Aristotle
could be said to have had a complete
theory of resistance to tyrants, both recognized the necessity of disobedience when
those in power were ruling for their own
good and not for the common good, and
Plato's master, Socrates, chose death in
preference to submission to commands
which violated his sense of justice.7
But it was not until the later Middle
Ages that the problem of resistance became a definite part of political theory.
Even then there were a few voices raised
on the side of patient submission to tyranny, most notably that of John Wyclif,
7 Perhaps

it would be more accurate to say that
both Plato and Aristotle recognized the fact,
rather than the theory, of resistance to tryants.
PLATO REPUBLIC VIII, 565-569; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS V, 10.
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but by far the greater number of thinkers
advocated more active resistance. John of
Salisbury in the twelfth century advocated
the overthrow of tyrants, including death
if necessary, though he qualified this by
warning th~it poison was not a permissable
weapon even against tyrants and that no
one who was under an oath to a tyrant
might kill him. Others soon dropped the
qualifications and by 1407 Jean Petit was
maintaining it to be a meritorious act for
any subject to kill a tyrant or to cause him
to be killed."
By far the most important medieval
treatment of civil disobedience was that of
St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas' fullest
consideration of the issue is in an early
work, his Commentary on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard, in the context of a discussion of the obedience owed by Christians to the secular power.' His primary
principle is that political authority is derived from God and therefore binding in
conscience on Christians. There are, however, some cases in which authority is
defective in title or exercise and therefore
not derived from God, and in such cases
there is no obligation of obedience. (The
defect of personal unworthiness for his
office in the ruler is not a sufficient ground
for disobedience, since the duty of disobedience does not rest on the worthiness
of the superior.) The first of the two situations in which the right to disobey arises
is where the ruler has seized power illegally, though where his title is subsequently
legitimated by the consent of the people or
by the intervention of a higher authority
the duty of obedience resumes.
8On these and other medieval theories see JASZI
& LEwis, AGAINST THE TYRANT 17-34 (1957).
9 AQUINAS, SCRIPTUM SUPER SENTENTITS, II, dist.
44, quest. 2, art. 2 (1932).

The second situation in which the subject is freed from his duty of obedience is
where the ruler abuses his authority. Where
the abuse of authority is of such a character that, though the ruler is exceeding his
legal power, he is not commanding the
subject to the performance of something
evil in itself, or forbidding him to perform
something good in itself, then the subject
is free either to obey or disobey; but where
the abuse is of such a character that the
ruler is commanding a sinful act, "in such
a case not only is there no obligation to
obey the authority, but one is obliged to
disobey it, as did the holy martyrs, who
suffered death rather than obey the impious commands of tyrants."
In summary, then, for Aquinas a subject
is not bound to obey a ruler who has either
usurped power or who, though legitimate,
is ruling unjustly-though in a later text
he adds the qualification, "unless perhaps
to avoid scandal or greater evil"-and
when a ruler contravenes the very purpose
of his authority by ordering a sinful action,
the subject is under an obligation not to
obey.
This is without question a theory of disobedience, but it is far from clear that it
is a theory of active resistance. St. Thomas
does allow active resistance and even tyrannicide where a ruler has possessed himself of power through violence and there
is no possibility of appeal to a higher authority who could pass judgment on the
case, but his reference to the early Christian martyrs would suggest that he does
not mean to endorse anything more than
passive resistance in situations of abuse of
authority. This, indeed, is how he is read
by his quasi-official commentator, Cardinal
Cajetan, who says that a tyrant who has
usurped power may rightly be killed by a
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private person, but that a tyrant who has
gained power legitimately may not be
killed, no matter how iniquitous his rule.1
This would tie in, too, with the view expressed in that work of somewhat doubtful
Thomistic authenticity, the De Regno, that
private persons should not on their own
private presumption attempt to kill rulers
who are tyrants, but that it is quite legitimate for a people which has the right of
providing itself with a ruler to depose (and
presumably slay, if he fights back) a tyrant, for this is not done by the private
presumption of a few but rather by public
authority."
Tyrannicide, and resistance generally,
was largely a speculative problem in the
Middle Ages, but with the Renaissance and
the wars of religion it became a practical
political issue as well. The immediate effect
of the Protestant Revolution was to
strengthen the hand of those on the side of
authority, for both Luther and Calvin
1 2
stressed the duty of obedience to rulers.
For Calvin active resistance was never permissible; even a wicked ruler might not be
resisted-though a subject must never perform sinful acts at the ruler's bidding, his
only right is to endure punishment passively. Calvin's follower, John Knox, was,
however, of a different mind, and was not
hesitant in telling Mary Queen of Scots
that princes-and princesses-who exceed
their bounds might be resisted with force
by their subjects; and in France it was not
long before persecution of the Huguenots
drove them to the position that it is lawful to resist tyrants.
Catholic theory, too, began to stress
'10CAJETAN, COMMENTARIUM

IN SUMMA

THEO-
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more and more the theory of active resistance to tyranny, perhaps given impetus by
Catholic practice. Henry III of France, for
example, was assassinated by a Dominican
friar who, himself killed on the spot, was
proclaimed as a martyr by his Order and
by many other Catholics. The theoretical
foundations of the practice were supplied
by a Spanish Jesuit, Mariana, who wrote
about the year 1600.
Mariana's Jesuit contemporary, Suarez.
held largely to the position of St. Thomas,
distinguishing between the tyrant who is
a usurper and the tyrant who is a legitimate ruler but who abuses his power.
Force may be used against a usurper, he
holds, but against a legitimate tyrant only
passive resistance is available as a weapon.
Further, he cautions that even in the case
of a usurper submission is better than revolt, unless the tyrant's oppression becomes
intolerable.1
Mariana did not, however, write with
Suarezian caution and he defended in no
uncertain terms the Dominican assassin of
Henry III, who was clearly a legitimate
ruler and not a usurper. Mariana openly
endorsed the right of a private individual
to slay a legitimate king turned tyrant,
though he does append the qualification
that he may not do so until the tyrant has
first been warned by the assembly of the
people that he is in danger of deposition
and has failed to heed the warning. However, if the tyrant prevents the convening
of a public assembly, public judgment is
rendered impossible, and an assassin may
then proceed on the basis of his own judgment enlightened by the counsel of "learned
and grave men." The Dominican assassin
had fulfilled this latter condition because

LOGIAE, I-ILI, quest. 64, art. 3 (1897).
11 AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP ch. 6 (1949).
12 On Luther and Calvin see JASZI & LEWIS, op.

13 SUAREZ, DEFENSIO FIDEI CATHOLICAE ET

cit. supra note 8, at 44-48.

TOLICAE ch. 4 (1613).

APos-
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before performing the deed he had con14
sulted the theologians of his Order.
Mariana's book was burned by the authorities in France and his views increased
the hostility of non-Catholics--and some
Catholics-towards the Jesuits, but in the
long run his ideas carried the day. The
principles of Suarez and Bellarmine led
logically in the same direction, particularly
their opposition to the divine right of kings
and their advocacy of the theory that a
ruler derives his authority immediately
from the people and only ultimately from
God: 15 such doctrines could logically lead
only to one conclusion, that in any circumstances in which a ruler turns into a tyrant,
whether he was originally a legitimate ruler
or not, he may be deposed by the people,
even by force if necessary. This became the
generally accepted view in the secular
world with the theories of Locke and Jefferson and the American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century, and
more especially with the rise of liberal
democracy in the nineteenth century. The
Catholic fought a rearguard action against
popular sovereignty (and especially popular
revolutions) throughout most of the nineteenth century, but with the accession of
Leo XIII to the papacy in 1878 the triumph of the democratic view and the concomitant theory of active resistance to all
tyrannical rule was assured.
In developing a natural-law theory of
civil disobedience we must first of all
clearly understand that ordinarily law is
binding in conscience and must be obeyed
in full. St. Thomas Aquinas' statement of
thisi 6 is that a law which is just obliges in
14 MARIANA,

DE REGE ET REGIS INSTITUTIONE

I,

chs. 5, 6 (1605).
15 SUAREZ, DEFENSIO FIDEI CATHOLICAE ET Apos-

TOLICAE I'll, ch. 2 (1613).
16 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II,

art. 4 (1949).

quest.

96,

conscience, and he goes on to say that it
is just if it is for the common good, if it
establishes burdens on a basis of proportionate equality, and if it issues from duly
constituted authority. A rule which does
not meet all of these requirements does
not oblige in conscience, except to avoid
scandal, i.e., where it would encourage
disrespect for law generally. There is no
room in this theory for the pernicious
theory of purely penal law, the theory that
law does not bind in conscience and that
the only moral obligation is to pay the
penalty assessed if one is caught in a violation. Every law which is just is for the
common good and must be obeyed. Of
course, such a theory imposes grave obligations on both ruler and subject.
On the side of the legislator, there is
an obligation to govern in accordance with
right reason and the exigencies of the common good. The legislator's duty is to guide
the people to good, to expand their moral
horizons. This he cannot do directly, but
must concentrate on creating favourable
conditions for the development of fully
mature persons, who will seek good, iot
because they are ordered to do so, but by
reason of its own attractiveness to them.
On the side of the citizen there is the
corresponding duty to respond to the reasonable guidance of the legislator. The subject must be docile towards the law either
because he recognizes its intrinsic reasonableness or because he accepts its utility,
even when it is in itself no more reasonable
than the contrary rule would have been.
But more important than docility to the
law is engagement with it. The full moral
life requires participation by the citizen
in the legal process in that he must himself ratify or approve by an act of his own
judgment the judgment of the legislator as
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expressed in the law, so that his obedience
to the law can be the result of his own
reasonable will, and not merely imposed
from without.
Now obviously the citizen cannot himself give prolonged consideration to every
law that may affect him. In the vast majority of cases he must be able to rely on
the legislator's judgment, for social life
could not function successfully if every
man had to verify and justify in his own
mind the reasonableness of every law before he obeyed it. Yet blind submission to
authority is not enough for the full moral
life; some understanding of the purpose
and purport of the law is necessary.
It is especially necessary that a citizen
should satisfy himself as fully as possible
of the justice of any law which makes special demands on him because of its relation to his profession or mode of life. The
purpose. of the process of ratification by
the citizen is that he will thus be able to
make the legislator's judgment his own,
and obey the law, nay embrace the law,
not because the legislator threatens him
with sanctions if he does not, but because
his reason demands that he act this way.
It is possible, however, that the subject's
consideration of a given law will lead him
to have doubts as to its reasonableness. In
such a case he has the obligation to do
what is necessary to resolve his doubt.
First, he should engage in a study of the
issue involved-and it is hardly necessary
to add that the extent of the study made
should be proportionate to the importance
of the issue. Second, he should consult with
others, especially those learned in the problem; as Chief Justice Warren remarked
recently, "None of us is so perfect as to be
able to rely solely on his individual judgment in moral issues, especially those
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which involve his deepest emotions."'1 7 A
Christian should obviously include among
his counselors in ethics theologians and
ministers of religion.
If after deliberation and consultation,
the citizen is still in doubt as to the reasonableness of the law, the presumption that
the law is just comes into play. The famous
maxim of St. Alphonsus Ligouri, lex
in dubio praesumitur justa5 (when it is
doubtful, the law is presumed to be just),
resembles the maxim of the common law,
omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse
acta (all acts are presumed to have done
rightly and regularly). The presumption
contained in these maxims is what lawyers
call a rebuttable presumption and not an
irrebuttable one.
Even if the citizen decides that the law
is unjust, he must still make a decision as
to whether to obey or not. In some cases,
St. Thomas suggests that the citizen must
disobey; these are cases in which the law
in question is intrinsically evil and commands that the particular citizen directly
perform an evil act, or forbids the performance of some good act. 9 There is no
ready-made casuistry for such cases, but
it would seem clear that while in such a
case a citizen must disobey the particular
law, he would not thereby necessarily have
17 Warren, The Law Beyond the Law, Washington Sunday Star, Nov. 25, 1962, p. B-2, col. 5.

IS ST. ALPHONSUS, THEOLOGIA MORALIS I, n. 9;

II, n. 617 (1773). Dr. Gordon Zahn, in his book
German Catholics and Hitler's Wars (1962),
has recently called attention to the abuse of the
presumption of justice by churchmen in Nazi
Germany. There is no reason in a totalitarian dictatorship for a presumption that law is just, at
least not with regard to politically motivated laws.
In my view there is a burden of proof on such a
government to establish the justice of its enactments.
19 Aquinas, supra note 16.
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leave to disobey the government in other
particulars. For example, there are legal
procedures in some U.S. states which provide for sterilization of the feeble-minded
and the indigent. Catholics believe that
such sterilization laws are immoral and
they may not, of course, obey these laws in
any particular. However, the vast majority
of Catholics would never have any occasion to come into contact with such laws
and they cannot use their disapproval of
government action in this one sphere to
serve as an excuse to disobey the laws
generally. Not even the Catholics who
might be professionally involved with such
laws could, I think, take such an approach.
Unless the immoral law were of such a
kind as to give rise to a general system
of injustice, the disobedience even of the
group directly concerned with the injustice
would have to be restricted to the area of
injustice.
Beside cases in which disobedience is
mandatory, there are also cases of unjust
laws where the injustice is not of so serious
a nature, and where according to St.
Thomas disobedience of the particular unjust law is permissible but not mandatory.
St. Thomas, however, points out that in
cases of this kind obedience may conceivably be required for extrinsic reasons,
that is, to avoid scandal or greater evil.20
For example, the unjust law might be of a
very minor nature so that obedience to it
would do very little harm, whereas public
flouting of it might have the effect of bringing the law generally into disrepute and
lead others to take a lighter view of the
law than they ought. Or even if the unjust
law imposed a more serious burden on
those affected by it, disobedience to it

might not be possible without giving rise to
large-scale civil unrest and even bloodshed,
and the cost of disobedience might be thus
greater than the good to be achieved.
No answer can be given on principle to
such cases, for they are entirely a matter
of the prudential balancing of the degree
of good that would be achieved by disobedience on the one hand and the degree
of evil. that would be caused by the disobedience on the other. But it goes almost
without saying that no one should decide
on a course of civil disobedience where
the repercussions are likely to be of any
significance at all without serious study
and without consultation with men of
learning and wisdom.
It will surprise no one that in a situation where the solution depends upon individual prudential application of principle, with the principles so general as to
be of only minimal assistance and with almost the whole field thus left to prudence,
different men will come to different conclusions. There is an amusing story in this
connection about Thoreau and Emerson.
Thoreau as you know wrote a book called
On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, a subject he took quite seriously and in 1845 he
personally seceded from the United States
as the most efficacious protest he could
make against a country which tolerated
slavery. As part of his anti-slavery campaign he spent a night in jail by way of
protest. When Emerson went to see him in
jail, he said, "What are you doing in there,
Henry?" Thoreau looked at him through
the bars and replied: "What are you doing
21
out there, Ralph?"
So far we have considered the general

20 Ibid.

A

21 This story is related in BUCHANAN & LYFORD,
CONVERSATION ON REVOLUTION 18 (1962).
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attitude towards disobedience and the justification found in a particular moral philosophy for disobedience, but we have
done no more than mention in passing the
forms that disobedience should take. To
this we must now turn our attention.
The basic distinction to be drawn in this
area is between active and passive resistance. This distinction does not express the
difference between doing something and
doing nothing, but rather the difference
between a violent response to injustice and
a non-violent response. Passive resistance
involves action just as much as does active
resistance; campaigns of passive resistance
have normally been opened by acts of
commission rather than by those of omission, but they have been peaceful rather
than violent acts of commission.
There are a number of forms of passive
or non-violent resistance. A distinction
sometimes drawn is between non-cooperation and civil disobedience. Non-cooperation is the more passive of the two, involving usually resignation of certain benefits enjoyed under the system attacked,
whereas civil disobedience involves the
performing of certain acts which will compel a response by a dominant group,
whether it take the form of arrest of the
resisters or some other form.
By far the most important form of passive resistance, however, is that developed
by Mahatma Gandhi in the Union of South
Africa before the First World War and in
India after the war. Gandhi gave the name
of "Satyagraha" to this type of resistance,
from the Indian words "satya," love, and
"agraha," firmness of force. Satyagraha is
therefore "the Force which is born of
Truth and Love," to use Gandhi's own
words.
Gandhi distinguished "satyagraha" from
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ordinary passive resistance on the basis of
the motives of the resisters. Orthodox passive resistance results from the weakness of
the resisters. The overriding consideration
is not non-violence but expediency, and
the resisters would not necessarily eschew
violence if their strength were equal to or
greater than the strength of the majority.
In "satyagraha," however, non-violence is
an expression of strength, not of weakness,
for it relies on the moral superiority of the
soul over the body, and in Gandhi's case
at least it was accompanied by a belief that
violence is sinful under all circumstances.
One authority, Leo Kuper, 22 objects to
this formulation of the distinction because
of the difficulty of analyzing motives and
because of the dissimilarity in motives
among "satyagrahis." He suggests a distinction rather in terms of the means by
which change is to be effected. From this
viewpoint orthodox passive resistance aims
at change through embarrassment of the
rulers, whereas "satyagraha" aims at
change through conversion of the rulers.
Common forms of orthodox passive resistance are processions, strikes, picketing,
withholding of labor, boycott of administrative positions (such as posts in segregated departments), and boycott of commodities. The choice of means depends on
the kind of society involved, and the relationship between ends and means is direct and observable. Success will usually
depend on the extent of mass participation,
because this will extend the embarrassment
of the rulers.
"Satyagraha" is a method of securing
rights by the suffering of the resister, not

22 KUPER, PASSIVE RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

(1956). For my discussion of passive generally I
am much indebted to Mr. Kuper's analysis.
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of the persons resisted. Thus suffering is a
positive value in Gandhi's theory, one
which is actively sought, and so "satyagraha" sets force as well as the laws at
nought. The end sought is not the embarrassment or coercion of the government, but rather the conversion of the
rulers through the suffering of the resisters.
Some of the means used by "satyagrahis"
may be the same as those used by orthodox passive resisters, but the preferred
technique is a breach of laws the violation
of which does not involve moral evil in
itself-the breach of mere regulations, for
example. There need be no direct relationship between means and ends; it is sufficient if the conscience of the majority is
stirred by any act of the "satyagrahis,"
however remote from the cause of the resistance. Here the Gandhian fast or hunger
strike.
For "satyagraha" to succeed there must
be a certain amount of cooperation on both
sides. On the one side the rulers must impose the punishment prescribed by law for
the violation of the ordinance. Publicity is
essential so that the knowledge of the fact
and the purpose of the suffering is brought
home to all members of the ruling majority.
Thus for success the act of resistance must
be public and the trial must also be public
and publicized. On the side of the "satyagrahis" resistance must stop short of the
complete breakdown of the social order.
Moreover, the "satyagrahis" must absolutely avoid all bitterness toward the rulers,
for the whole campaign must be conducted
with love. In practice, aside from Gandhi's
fasts, pure "satyagraha" has seldom, if
ever, been realized, and even Gandhi relied
to some extent on mass following and accepted the impure motives of many of his
followers. Perhaps it is unreasonable to

expect the total exclusion of considerations
of expediency from any movement, and
more profitable to observe the general
tendency engendered, but it is important
to stress the utmost purification of means.
Gandhi's "satyagraha" was able to succeed in South Africa and in India both because it was able to gain support at the
expense of its own purity and because (and
I think this is the more significant reason)
his victims were the British, who, in the
long run, at least, have always proved
themselves a people of tender conscience.
"Satyagraha" in Hitlerite Germany or in
Stalinist Russia would have been worthless,
and it is an open question whether the
commitment of the majority in both South
Africa and the southern United States today to their ideologies of white supremacy
is not so strong and so blind that a more
active resistance is not the eventual solu23
tion.
Be that as it may, I think it is not open
to dispute that the more suitable form of
resistance in a democratic society such as
we live in is passive resistance, and that
in most circumstances the counsel of passive resistance assumes the dimensions of a
moral imperative. The physicians in Saskatchewan did not infringe this principle,
but the students at the University of Mississippi did, and egregiously. In this sense,
then, we can justify President Kennedy's
remark that "Americans are free . . . to
disagree with the law-but not to disobey
it." Interpreted to mean that there is no
right of resistance to duly enacted law in
democratic society, the statement appears
both to contradict Western history and to
violate sound moral doctrine. But inter23 In fact Negro protests in the United States in

1963 seem to be verging more and more towards
active resistance.
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preted to mean that in a democratic society there is a right to express disagreement with the law through various forms of
passive resistance but that'there is not a
right to disobey the law violently, the
statement appears to be a reasonable commentary on the normal conditions in a
free society, where violent revolutions are
not necessary in order to overthrow the
existing regime, for a mere majority of
ballots cast at a stated interval will peacefully obtain the same result.
A democracy should be tolerant of minorities, even to the extent of allowing
them to indulge in civil disobedience as
far as is compatible with the common good.
Minorities, on their part, must not only
display a general respect for the law, but
must also be painstaking in their awareness of the importance of purity of means.
The physicians in Saskatchewan would
have been on much surer moral ground
if, instead of withdrawing their services
from the public they had utilized the nobler
means of carrying on as usual but refusing
to accept the government's pay checks. But
at least the physicians were attempting to
change a merely external thing, a statute
(and one which they felt was extremely
unjust), and were not primarily concerned
with attempting to change an attitude or
state of mind..
It is not easy to make a true judgment
of situations which are still in flux. It was,
of course, easy to judge even at the time
that the violent mob of rebellious students
in Oxford, Mississippi, was acting wrongfully, but most other situations are not so
clearcut. My own feeling is that the nuclear
disarmers in Great Britain, who are attempting to achieve a moral result, conversion to a belief in the necessity of disarming, through physical means (mass sitdowns

in the streets, disturbances at American naval bases) suitable only for the embarrassment of the rulers and not for their conversion, are acting beyond and against the rule
of law, whereas the Negro demonstrators in
Birmingham, Alabama, are acting in an acceptable manner. In the latter case the
mob is essentially peaceful in intent and
performance, it is aiming primarily at an
external achievement-equality in accommodation, service, and employment,-and
it is reacting against a long-standing grievance which has failed to respond to any
other treatment. 24 At this writing the fate
of the President's new civil rights legislation has not been decided, but it is obvious
at least that without the events in Birmingham no such bill would have been even
proposed this year.
I have not stressed in this paper the
objective character of the natural-law principles and the moral precepts which judge
law. For one thing there is far from total
agreement, even among natural lawyers, as
to their content. More important, even
when there is agreement on the principles,
there may quite possibly be disagreement
in practice, for the ultimate determinant in
this area is a prudential judgment. This is
not to say that there is no objectivity, but
merely to say that it does not seem profitable to emphasize it.25

A judgment of this kind is very tenuous because, of course, the Negroes in the U. S. are
also hopeful of changing the attitudes of whites.
25 There is much more objectivity in the question
whether a particular law is good or bad than in
the question of disobedience to a 'bad law. In the
24

latter case one must establish not only that the
law is bad, which may be capable of demonstration, but also that toleration of it is worse than
disobedience. Even men who agree on the evil of
a law may disagree as to whether they ought to
oppose it, even passively.

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

One rule that can be laid down with
certainty is that the question as to whether
or not to disobey a law cannot be answered
in abstraction from the question as to what
forms of disobedience will be employed
should resistance be resolved upon. If the
concrete situation is such that only active
resistance can be of any avail in righting
the injustice, then clearly the preponderance of good resulting from the overthrow
of the existing order would have to be
overwhelming indeed in order to justify
such a step in a democracy.
But if in the situation at hand passive
resistance, especially in one of its lesser
forms, might be efficacious in restoring the
order of justice, then the decision to resist
might be taken with a much lesser preponderance of resultant good. In a totalitarian society, of course, the decision to
resist may be taken comparatively easily,
but it is highly doubtful if any measures of
passive resistance will prove efficacious.
In summary, then, we the people are
possessed of the right to disobey an unjust
law, but we must exercise our right with

great restraint, particularly when it is a
question of violent resistance. And in a
free society the normal form of disobedience to law, where disobedience is tolerable
at all, is passive resistance, and only the
most extraordinary circumstances could
conceivably justify the employment of violent means of resistance. Our liberty, if it is
to endure for more than a passing moment,
must be grounded, not on the fear of civil
discord, but on the freely won tolerance of
20
our fellows.
have not been concerned in this paper with
the situation of the judge who faces an unjust
law, but only with the plight of the citizen.
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STUDIES 38 (1962), has recently taken the position that a judge should enforce every duly enacted law regardless of his feelings about it. The
view of O'Meara, Natural Law and Everyday
Law, 5 NATURAL L.F. 83, 84 (1960), is that a
judge must resign when confronted with a law
which he cannot square with his conscience.
There is a full discussion of the moral obligations
of judges in DAVIS, THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CATHOLIC CIVIL JUDGES (1933). See also MacGuigan, Positive Law and the Moral Law, 2 CURRENT L. AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 89, 111-121
(1961).

